Introduction
A.
Recent literature on "privatization" of resources emphasizes the advantages of private ownership and market exchange over bureaucratic control and allocation:
1. Stroup and Baden (1983) emphasized the rigidities of nontransferable public rights in resources and the inefficiencies of bureaucratic resource management in energy, groundwater, and timber.
2.
Rent seeking under government agency programs has r been analyzed by a. Gardner (1983) and Rucker and Fishback (1983) for water;
b. Libecap (1978; 1982; 1984; 1986) for minerals, rangelands, and petroleum; c. Deacon and Johnson (1985) for forestry.
3. Anderson (1983a, b) has analyzed the transition of western water rights from early (mining) appropriations doctrine to the concept of "beneficial use."
B. The establishment of markets is usually inhibited in the presence of pervasive externalities, such as water pollution or changes in return flows. The sale of r water nearly always has positive and/or negative direct impacts on third parties. Yet, fairly extensive markets have developed for water, and these markets, while sometimes involving rather high transaction costs, appear to have been successful in tranferring water from lower-valued to higher-valued uses over time.
C. It is increasingly important that existing water supplies be allocated more efficiently than in the past because: (Gardner, 1985; Costello and Cole, 1985) . Howe and Lee (1983) have argued that one of the best means of protecting instream flows would be to extend this capability to local governments.
III. Strengthening the Weaknesses of Water Markets
A. The main administrative problem in water markets is the existence of "third-party" effects that take the forms of changed return flows, changed groundwater levels, and water quality changes. 2. An optimal water allocation rule is generally neither a priority rule nor a proportional rule.
3.
If short term water markets (rental markets) work efficiently, the type of water right may not be important.
V. The Potential for Expanded Markets
A. Flexibility in a water allocation system implies that it is desirable to maximize the scope of the market so that useful transactions can take place over as wide a geographical area and among as wide a variety of participants as possible.
1.
The size of the market is limited by transfer costs and by transaction costs, i.e. by the costs of channeling the water from one place to another and of gathering information, putting buyers and sellers in contact, and legally effecting transfers.
2.
The tradable margin need not be large to provide the needed flexibility. 
D.
The potential gains from an expanded role for water markets warrant a high priority for research on procedures for expanding their role. The payoff will be much higher than from the continuation of inefficient allocative practices of the past and from the attempts to find ever more new supplies.
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